We develop a new methodology for utilizing the prior techniques to prove selective security for functional encryption systems as a direct ingredient in devising proofs of full security. This deepens the relationship between the selective and full security models and provides a path for transferring the best qualities of selectively secure systems to fully secure systems. In particular, we present a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme that is proven fully secure while matching the efficiency of the state of the art selectively secure systems.
Introduction
Functional encryption presents a vision for public key cryptosystems that provide a strong combination of flexibility, efficiency, and security. In a functional encryption scheme, ciphertexts are associated with descriptive values x, secret keys are associated with descriptive values y, and a function f (x, y) determines what a user with a key for value y should learn from a ciphertext with value x. One well-studied example of functional encryption is attribute-based encryption (ABE), first introduced in [31] , in which ciphertexts and keys are associated with access policies over attributes and subsets of attributes. A key will decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the associated set of attributes satisfies the associated access policy. There are two types of ABE systems: Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE), where ciphertexts are associated with access policies and keys are associated with sets of attributes, and Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), where keys are associated with access policies and ciphertexts are associated with sets of attributes.
To achieve desired flexibility, one strives to construct ABE systems for suitably expressive types of access policies over many attributes. Current constructions allow boolean formulas or linear secret sharing schemes as access policies. This high level of flexibility means that keys and ciphertexts have rich structure, and there is a very large space of possible access policies and attribute sets. This presents a challenge to proving security, since a suitable notion of security in this setting must enforce collusion resistance, meaning that several users should not be able to decrypt a message that none of them are individually authorized to read. Hence a security proof must consider an attacker who can collect many different keys, just not a single one that is authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
This requires security reductions to balance two competing goals: the simulator must be powerful enough to provide the attacker with the many keys that it adaptively requests, but it must also lack some critical knowledge that it can gain from the attacker's success. The first security proofs in the standard model for ABE systems (e.g. [31, 19, 36] ) followed a very natural paradigm for balancing these two goals known as partitioning. This proof technique was previously used in the context of identity-based encryption [9, 11, 6, 7, 34] . In a partitioning proof, the simulator sets up the system so that the space of all possible secret keys is partitioned into two pieces: keys that the simulator can make and those that it cannot. To ensure that the keys the attacker requests all fall in the set of keys the simulator can produce and that any key capable of decrypting the challenge ciphertext falls in the opposite set, the prior works [31, 19, 36] had to rely on a weaker security model known as selective security. In the selective security model, the attacker must declare up front what the challenge ciphertext will be, before seeing the public parameters.
This notion of selective security is quite useful as an intermediary step, but is rather unsatisfying as an end goal. In the setting of identity-based encryption, the need for selectivity was overcome by arranging for the simulator to "guess" a partition and abort when the attacker violated its constraints [34] . However, the richer structure of attribute-based systems appears to doom this approach to incur exponential loss, since one must guess a partition that respects the partial ordering induced by the powers allocated to the individual keys.
Dual System Encryption With the goal of moving beyond the constraints of the partitioning paradigm, Waters introduced the dual system encryption methodology [35] . In a dual system security proof, the simulator is always prepared to make any key and any challenge ciphertext. The high level idea of the methodology is as follows. There are two types of keys and ciphertexts: normal and semi-functional. A key will decrypt a ciphertext properly unless both the key and the ciphertext are semi-functional, in which case decryption will fail with all but negligible probability. The normal keys and ciphertexts are used in the real system, while the semi-functional objects are gradually introduced in the hybrid security proof -first the ciphertext is changed from normal to semi-functional, and then the secret keys given to the attacker are changed from normal to semi-functional one by one. Ultimately, we arrive at a security game in which the simulator only has to produce semi-functional objects and security can be proved directly.
The most critical step of the hybrid proof is when a key turns semi-functional: at this point, we must leverage the fact that the key is not authorized to decrypt the (now semifunctional) challenge ciphertext in order to argue that the attacker cannot detect the change in the key. However, since we are not imposing a partition on the simulator, there is no constraint preventing the simulator itself from creating a key that is authorized to decrypt and testing the nature of the key for itself by attempting to decrypt the semi-functional ciphertext. In the first application of dual system encryption to ABE [23] , this paradox was averted by ensuring that the simulator could only produce a key that would be correlated with the semi-functional ciphertext so that decryption would succeed in the simulator's view, regardless of the presence or absence of semi-functionality. This correlation between a semi-functional key and semifunctional ciphertext was called nominal semi-functionality. It was argued that this correlation was hidden information-theoretically from the attacker, who cannot request keys authorized to decrypt the challenge ciphertext. This provided the first proof of full security for an ABE scheme in the standard model.
The One-Use Restriction
The information-theoretic argument in [23] required a one-use restriction on attributes in access formulas/LSSS matrices, meaning that a single attribute could only be used once in a policy. This can be extended to a system which allows reuse of attributes by setting a fixed bound M on the maximum number of times an attribute may be used and having separate parameters for each use. This scales the size of the public parameters by M , as well as the size of secret keys for CP-ABE systems 1 . This approach incurs a very significant loss in efficiency, and has been inherited by all fully secure schemes to date ( [25, 29] employ the same technique). This loss in efficiency is costly enough to limit the potential applications of fully secure schemes. As an example, the recent work of [2] building verifiable computation schemes from KP-ABE systems only produces meaningful results when one starts with a KP-ABE scheme that can be proven secure without incurring the blowup of this encoding technique.
Our work eliminates this efficiency loss and allows unrestricted use of attributes while still proving full security in the standard model. Our main observation is motivated by the intuition that the information-theoretic step of the prior dual system proof is ceding too much ground to the attacker, since a computational argument would suffice. In fact, we are able to resurrect the earlier selective proof techniques inside the framework of dual system encryption in order to retake ground and obtain a wholly computational proof of full security.
Our Techniques Dual system encryption is typically implemented by designing a "semifunctional space" where semi-functional components of keys and ciphertexts will behave like a parallel copy of the normal components of the system, except divorced from the public parameters. This provides a mechanism allowing for delayed parameters in the semi-functional space, meaning that relevant variables can be defined later in the simulation instead of needing to be fixed in the setup phase. The hybrid structure of a dual system encryption argument is implemented by additionally providing a mechanism for key isolation, meaning that some or all of the semi-functional parameters will only be relevant to the distribution of a single semi-functional key at a time.
In combination, these two mechanisms mean that the semi-functional space has its own fresh parameters that can be decided on the fly by the simulator when they become relevant, and they are only relevant for the semi-functional ciphertext and a single semi-functional key. Previous dual system encryption arguments have used the isolated use of these delayed semi-functional parameters as a source of entropy in the attacker's view to make an information-theoretic argument. We observe that these mechanisms can also be used to implement prior techniques for selective security proofs, without needing to impose the selective restriction on the attacker.
To explain this more precisely, we consider the critical step in the hybrid security proof when a particular key becomes semi-functional. We conceptualize the unpublished semi-functional parameters as being defined belatedly when the simulator first issues either the key in question or the semi-functional ciphertext. For concreteness, we consider a CP-ABE system. If the ciphertext is issued first, then the simulator learns the challenge policy before defining the delayed semi-functional parameters -this is closely analogous to the setting of selective security for a CP-ABE system. If the key is issued first, then the simulator learns the relevant set of attributes before defining the delayed semi-functional parameters, and this is closely analogous to the setting of selective security for a KP-ABE system. This provides us an opportunity to combine the techniques used to prove selective security for both CP-ABE and KP-ABE systems with the dual system encryption methodology in order to obtain a new proof of full security that maintains the efficiency of selectively secure systems.
Organization
In Section 2, we give the relevant background on CP-ABE systems and composite order bilinear groups, as well as formal statements of the complexity assumptions we rely on in the composite order setting. In Section 3, we present our CP-ABE system in composite order bilinear groups. In Section 4, we prove its full security. In Section 5, we give the relevant background for prime order bilinear groups, state our complexity assumptions in this context, present the prime order variant of our CP-ABE construction, and prove its full security. In Appendix A, we provide a reduction between assumptions that we use in in the prime order setting. In Appendix B, we justify our q-based assumption in the generic group model.
Preliminaries

Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We will first construct our system in composite order bilinear groups, which were introduced in [10] . We let G denote a group generator -an algorithm which takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a description of a bilinear group G. We define G's output as (N, G, G T , e), where N = p 1 p 2 p 3 is a product of three distinct primes, G and G T are cyclic groups of order N , and e : G 2 → G T is a map such that:
We refer to G as the source group and G T as the target group. We assume that the group operations in G and G T and the map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ, and the group descriptions of G and G T include a generator of each group. We let G p 1 , G p 2 , and G p 3 denote the subgroups of order p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 in G respectively. We note that these subgroups are "orthogonal" to each other under the bilinear map e:
and g 3 generates G p 3 , then every element f of G can be expressed as g
for some values c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ∈ Z N . We will refer to g c 1 1 as the "G p 1 part of f ", for example.
Complexity Assumptions
We now present the complexity assumptions we will use in composite order bilinear groups. We use the notation X R ←− S to express that X is chosen uniformly randomly from the finite set S. We will consider groups G whose orders are products of three distinct primes. For any nonempty set Z ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, there is a corresponding subgroup of G of order ∏ i∈Z p i . We denote this subgroup by G Z . Our first assumption has been previously used in [24, 23] , for example, and holds in the generic group model: Assumption 1 Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
We say that G satisfies Assumption 1 if Adv 1 G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
We next define the General Subgroup Decision Assumption for composite order bilinear groups with three prime subgroups. This was first defined in [4] more generally for groups with an arbitrary number of prime order subgroups, but three will be sufficient for our purposes. We will only use a few specific instances of this assumption, but we prefer to state its full generality here for conciseness. We note that for our prime order construction, Assumption 1 and all instances of the General Subgroup Decision Assumption will be replaced by the Decisional Linear Assumption.
The General Subgroup Decision Assumption
We let G denote a group generator and Z 0 , Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z k denote a collection of non-empty subsets of {1, 2, 3} where each
Fixing the collection of sets Z 0 , . . . , Z k , we define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking this assumption to be:
We say that G satisfies the General Subgroup Decision Assumption if Adv SD G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A and any suitable collection of subsets Z 0 , . . . , Z k . This can be thought of as a family of assumptions, parameterized by the choice of the sets Z 0 , . . . , Z k . All of these individual assumptions hold in the generic group model, assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N . We will assume that
is negligible in the security parameter for each prime factor p i of N . In particular, this means we may assume (ignoring only negligible probability events) that when an element is randomly chosen from a subgroup of G, it is in fact a generator of that subgroup.
We next introduce an assumption that we call The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption in a Subgroup. This is a close relative of the standard Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption, but it has a challenge term remaining in the source group and takes place in a prime order subgroup of a composite order bilinear group. These adjustments from the usual DBDH assumption allow us to use our assumption in the semi-functional space for a particular keywithout affecting the normal space or the other keys.
The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption in a Subgroup Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We say that G satisfies The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption if Adv 3DH G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
We next introduce a q-based assumption that we call The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption in a Subgroup. This is a close relative of The Decisional q-parallel Bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent Assumption introduced in [36] , except that its challenge term remains in the source group and it takes place in a prime order subgroup of a composite order bilinear group. In Appendix B, we prove that the prime order variant of this assumption holds in the generic group model (the proof for this version follows analogously). Below, we use the notation [q], for example, to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , q}.
The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption in a Subgroup Given a group generator G and a positive integer q, we define the following distribution:
The adversary will be given:
We additionally define
We say that G satisfies The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption in a Subgroup if Adv
is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
Background for ABE
We now give required background material on access structures, the formal definition of a CP-ABE scheme, and the security definition we will use. In our setting, attributes will play the role of parties and we will consider only monotone access structures. One can (inefficiently) realize general access structures with our techniques by having the negation of an attribute be a separate attribute (so the total number of attributes doubles).
Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes Our construction will employ linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS). We use the following definition adapted from [3] . We note the linear reconstruction property: we suppose that Π is an LSSS for access structure A. We let S denote an authorized set, and define I ⊆ {1, . . . , ℓ} as I = {j|ρ(j) ∈ S}. Then the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the span of rows of A indexed by I, and there exist constants {ω j ∈ Z p } j∈I such that, for any valid shares {λ j } of a secret s according to Π, we have:
Definition 2. (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)
∑ j∈I ω j λ j = s. These constants {ω j } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix A [3] . For unauthorized sets, no such constants {ω j } exist.
For our composite order group construction, we will employ LSSS matrices over Z N , where N is a product of three distinct primes. As in the definition above over Z p , we say a set of attributes S is authorized if the rows of the access matrix A labeled by elements of S have the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo N . However, in our security proof for our composite order system, we will further assume that for an unauthorized set, the corresponding rows of A do not include the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) in their span modulo p 2 . We may assume this because if an adversary can produce an access matrix A over Z N and an unauthorized set over Z N that is authorized over Z p 2 , then this can be used to produce a non-trivial factor of the group order N , which would violate our general subgroup decision assumption.
CP-ABE Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption system consists of four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt.
Setup(λ, U) → (PP, MSK)
The setup algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and the attribute universe description U. It outputs the public parameters PP and a master secret key MSK.
for each key serves to prevent collusion, since it "ties" together the user's attributes. Our main system resides in the G p 1 subgroup, while the G p 2 subgroup is reserved as the semi-functional space, and the G p 3 subgroup provides additional randomness on keys that helps to isolate keys in the hybrid argument. We assume that messages to be encrypted as elements of the target group G T . Setup(λ, U) → PP, MSK The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 (3 distinct primes). We let G p i denote the subgroup of order p i in G. It then chooses random exponents α, a, κ ∈ Z N , and a random group element g ∈ G p 1 . For each attribute i ∈ U, it chooses a random value h i ∈ Z N . The public parameters PP are N, g, g a , g κ , e(g, g) α , H i = g h i ∀i. The master secret key MSK additionally contains g α and a generator g 3 of G p 3 .
KeyGen(MSK, S, PP) → SK The key generation algorithm chooses random exponents t, u ∈ Z N , and random elements R, R ′ , R ′′ , {R i } i∈S ∈ G p 3 (this can be done by raising a generator of G p 3 to random exponents modulo N ). The secret key is:
Encrypt((A, ρ), PP, M ) → CT For A an ℓ × n matrix and ρ a map from each row A j of A to an attribute ρ(j), the encryption algorithm chooses a random
The ciphertext is (we also include (A, ρ) in the ciphertext, though we do not write it below):
(The notation [ℓ] denotes the set {1, . . . , ℓ}.)
Decrypt(CT, PP, SK) → M For a secret key corresponding to an authorized set S, the decryption algorithm computes constants ω j ∈ Z N such that
Then M can be recovered as C 0 /e(g, g) αs .
Correctness We observe that
Security Proof
We now prove the following theorem: Our security proof is obtained via a hybrid argument over a sequence of games. We let Game real denote the real security game as defined in Section 2.3.3. To describe the rest of the games, we must first define semi-functional keys and ciphertexts. We let g 2 denote a fixed generator of the subgroup G p 2 .
Semi-functional Keys
To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
One then chooses a random element W ∈ G p 2 and forms the semi-functional key as:
In other words, all of the elements remain unchanged except for K, which is multiplied by a random element of G p 2 .
Semi-functional Ciphertexts
To produce a semi-functional ciphertext for an LSSS matrix (A, ρ), one first calls the normal encryption algorithm to produce a normal ciphertext consisting
with s ′ as its first entry, a random exponent η i ∈ Z N for each attribute i, and a random exponent γ j ∈ Z N for each j ∈ [ℓ]. The semi-functional ciphertext is formed as:
We observe that the structure of the elements in G p 2 here is similar to the structure in G p 1 , but is unrelated to the public parameters. More specifically, s ′ plays the role of s, w plays the role of v, a ′ plays the role of a, κ ′ plays the role of κ, η ρ(j) plays the role of h ρ(j) , and γ j plays the role of r j . While the values of a, κ, and the values h ρ(j) are determined modulo p 1 by the public parameters, the values of a ′ , κ ′ , η ρ(j) are freshly random modulo p 2 . These values a ′ , κ ′ , {η i } are chosen randomly once and then fixed -these same values will also be involved in additional types of semi-functional keys which we will define below.
We let Q denote the total number of key queries that the attacker makes. For each k from 0 to Q, we define Game k as follows.
Game k In this game, the ciphertext given to the attacker is semi-functional, as are the first k keys. The remaining keys are normal.
The outer structure of our hybrid argument will progress as follows. First, we transition from Game real to Game 0 , then to Game 1 , next to Game 2 , and so on. We ultimately arrive at Game Q , where the ciphertext and all of the keys given to the attacker are semi-functional. We then transition to Game f inal , which is defined to be like Game Q , except that the ciphertext given to the attacker is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. This will complete our security proof, since any attacker has a zero advantage in this final game.
The transitions from Game real to Game 0 and from Game Q to Game f inal are relatively easy, and can be accomplished directly via computational assumptions. The transitions from Game k−1 to Game k require more intricate arguments. For these steps, we will need to treat Phase I key requests (before the challenge ciphertext) and Phase II key requests (after the challenge ciphertext) differently. We will also need to define two additional types of semifunctional keys:
Nominal Semi-functional Keys These keys will share the values a ′ , κ ′ , η i modulo p 2 with the semi-functional ciphertext. To produce a nominal semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
One then chooses random exponents t ′ , u ′ ∈ Z N and forms the nominal semi-functional key as:
We note that a nominal semi-functional key still correctly decrypts a semi-functional ciphertext, since the terms in the G p 2 will cancel out upon completion of the decryption algorithm.
Temporary Semi-functional Keys These keys will still share the values η i modulo p 2 with the semi-functional ciphertext, but the G p 2 component attached to K will now be randomized. More formally, to produce a temporary semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of
One then chooses a random W ∈ G p 2 and random exponents t ′ , u ′ ∈ Z N . The temporary semi-functional key is formed as:
For each k from 1 to Q, we define the following additional games:
This is like Game k , except that the k th key given to the attacker is a nominal semifunctional key. The first k − 1 keys are still semi-functional in the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal.
Game T k
This is like Game k , except that the k th key given to the attacker is a temporary semi-functional key. The first k − 1 keys are still semi-functional in the original sense, while the remaining keys are normal.
The fact that the values a ′ , κ ′ , η i are shared among semi-functional ciphertexts, nominal semi-functional keys, and temporary semi-functional keys means that these values are fixed whenever they first appear in a security game. This could be when the semi-functional ciphertext is generated, when a nominal semi-functional key is generated, or in the case of the η i values, when a temporary semi-functional key is generated. The structure of temporary semi-functional keys is designed to fit the outcome of applying selective proof techniques to a single key and ciphertext pair within our hybrid game sequence.
In order to get from Game k−1 to Game k in our hybrid argument, we will transition first from Game k−1 to Game N k , then to Game T k , and finally to Game k . The transition from Game N k to Game T k will require different computational assumptions for Phase I and Phase II key queries. We let Q 1 denote the number of Phase I queries, and we will address this transition separately for k ≤ Q 1 and k > Q 1 . Our handling of Phase I queries will closely resemble the selective security proof strategy for KP-ABE in [19] , while our handling of Phase II queries will closely resemble the selective security proof strategy for CP-ABE in [36] .
The original versions of these arguments in [19, 36] relied on assumptions very close to ours, with the main difference being that the assumptions in [19, 36] had challenge terms in the target group G T instead of G. This is because the selective security arguments could afford to deal with all keys at once, and hence could use an assumption with a challenge in the target group to change the ciphertext to an encryption of a random message. This kind of change simultaneously affects the interaction of the ciphertext with all keys. In our hybrid framework, we need to handle keys individually, and hence we use an assumption with a challenge in the source group to change the nature of individual keys one at a time, saving our progress incrementally until we arrive at the final step and can afford to change to an encryption of a random message.
Our hybrid argument is accomplished in the following lemmas.
Lemma 5. Under the general subgroup decision assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between
Game real and Game 0 .
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between
Game real and Game 0 , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the general subgroup decision assumption with sets Z 0 := {1},
and T is either a random element of G p 1 or a random element of G p 1 p 2 . B will simulate either Game real or Game 0 with A, depending on the nature of T . B chooses random exponents α, a, κ, {h i } ∈ Z N and sets the public parameters as:
It gives these to A. We note that B knows the MSK. When A requests a secret key, B can call the normal key generation algorithm to create one. At some point, A requests a challenge ciphertext for an access matrix (A, ρ) and messages M 0 , M 1 . We let ℓ × n denote the dimensions of A. B chooses a random bit b and encrypts M b as follows. It implicitly sets g s equal to the G p 1 part of T . It chooses a random vectorṽ ∈ Z n N with first entry equal to 1. It implicitly sets v = sṽ. It also chooses random exponentsr j ∈ Z N for each j from 1 to ℓ. It implicitly sets r j = sr j . We note that the values of s, v, r j ∀j are properly distributed modulo p 1 . The ciphertext is formed as:
If T ∈ G p 1 , this is a properly distributed normal ciphertext, and B has properly simulated Game real with A. If T ∈ G p 1 p 2 , then this is a semi-functional ciphertext, with components in G p 2 set as: g s ′ 2 is the G p 2 part of T , κ ′ is equal to the value of κ modulo p 2 , a ′ is equal to the value of a modulo p 2 , w is equal to s ′ṽ modulo p 2 , and for each j, η ρ(j) is equal to the value of h ρ(j) modulo p 2 and γ j is equal to the value of s ′r j modulo p 2 . We note that these values are properly distributed, since the modulo p 1 and p 2 values of an element chosen uniformly at random modulo N are distributed as independent uniform random values by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. We also note that the public parameters only information-theoretically reveal the values of a, κ, h i modulo p 1 . Hence when T ∈ G p 1 p 2 , B has properly simulated Game 0 with A. Thus, B can leverage the non-negligible difference in A's advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against the general subgroup decision assumption.
Lemma 6. Under the general subgroup decision assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game k−1 and Game
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game k−1 and Game k for some k between 1 and Q, we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the general subgroup decision assumption with sets Z 0 := {1, 3}, 
It gives these to A. We note that B knows the MSK, and so can use the regular key generation algorithm to produce normal keys in response to A's later key queries.
To respond to A's first k − 1 key queries, B produces semi-functional keys as follows. First it uses the regular key generation algorithm to produce a normal key K, K ′ , K ′′ , {K i } i∈S . Then it chooses a random exponent τ ∈ Z N and forms the semi-functional key as:
We note that these semi-functional keys are properly distributed, as Y τ 2 is distributed as a uniformly random element of G p 2 .
To form the semi-functional challenge ciphertext for an ℓ×n access matrix (A, ρ) and message M b , B chooses random exponentsr j ∈ Z N for all j from 1 to ℓ. It also chooses a random vector v ∈ Z N with first entry equal to 1. It will implicitly set g s = X 1 , v = sṽ, and g r j = Xr j 1 . It computes the ciphertext as:
We note that this implicitly sets
To see that this is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext, note that the values of a, κ, and {h i } modulo p 2 are not revealed by the public parameters.
To create the k th requested key for an attribute set S, B chooses a random exponentũ ∈ Z N and random elements R, R ′ , R ′′ , {R i } ∈ G p 3 . It sets:
This implicitly sets g t to be the G p 1 part of T , and g u to be the G p 1 part of Tũ. We note that these are properly distributed as (independently) random elements of with A depending on the nature of T . B first chooses random exponents α, a, κ, {h i } ∈ Z N and sets the public parameters as:
It gives these to A. We note that B knows the MSK, and hence can use the normal key generation algorithm to make normal keys in response to A's key requests from the k + 1 request and onward. To respond to A's first k − 1 key requests, B creates semi-functional keys by first creating a normal key and then multiplying K by a random element of G p 2 (this can be obtained by raising the generator g 2 to a random exponent modulo N ). We let S denote the attribute set requested in the k th key query by A. Since we are assuming the k th key query occurs in Phase I, S is declared before B must produce the challenge ciphertext. This allows B to define the values η i modulo p 2 to be shared by the k th key and the semi-functional ciphertext after learning the set S. To set these values, B chooses random exponents η i ∈ Z N for each i ∈ S. For i / ∈ S, it implicitly sets η i modulo p 2 to be equal to xη i modulo p 2 , where random exponentsη i ∈ Z N are chosen for each i / ∈ S. It also implicitly sets a ′ equal to xy modulo p 2 .
To form the k th key, B first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key, K, K ′ , K ′′ , {K i } i∈S . It then chooses random exponents κ ′ , u ′ ∈ Z N and implicitly sets t ′ modulo p 2 equal to z modulo p 2 . It sets the key as:
We observe that if T = g xyz 2 , this will be a properly distributed nominal semi-functional key, and when T is random in G p 2 , this will be a properly distributed temporary semi-functional key.
To create the semi-functional challenge ciphertext for an ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ) and message M b , B first runs the normal encryption algorithm to produce a normal ciphertext, [ℓ] . We note the attribute set S cannot satisfy the access policy of (A, ρ). As a result, B can efficiently find a vectorw ∈ Z n N such thatw · A j = 0 modulo N for all j such that ρ(j) ∈ S and the first entry ofw is nonzero modulo each prime dividing N . Such a vector will exist as long as (1, 0, . . . , 0) is not in the span of {A j } ρ(j)∈S modulo each of p 1 , p 2 , p 3 . We may assume this holds with all but negligible probability, since we are assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N . This vectorw can be efficiently found by performing row reduction modulo N (we note that if one encounters a nonzero, non-invertible element of N during this process, then one has found a nontrivial factor of N ). Oncew is found, its first entry can be randomized by multiplying the vector by a random value modulo N . Thus, we may assume the first entry ofw is random modulo p 2 . We call this first entry s ′ .
B also chooses a random vector w ′ ∈ Z n N with first entry equal to 0. It will implicitly set the sharing vector w modulo p 2 so that a ′ w = xyw + w ′ (i.e. w =w + (xy) −1 w ′ ). We note that w is randomly distributed since the first entry ofw is random and the remaining entries of w ′ are random. B also chooses random values γ j ∈ Z N for each j such that ρ(j) ∈ S, and random valuesγ j ∈ Z N for each j such that ρ(j) / ∈ S. For these j's such that ρ(j) / ∈ S, it will implicitly set γ j = yη
We note that all of these values are properly distributed modulo p 2 . It forms the semi-functional ciphertext as:
To see that this is a properly formed semi-functional ciphertext, note that for j such that ρ(j) / ∈ S:
Here, B has embedded a y into the γ j term and used the x embedded in the η ρ(j) term to cancel out the xy term in a ′ A j · w that it cannot produce. When T = g xyz 2 , B has properly simulated Game N k , and when T is random in G p 2 , B has properly simulated Game T k . Hence B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption in a subgroup.
Lemma 8. Under the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup (and assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N ), no polynomial time attacker can achieve a nonnegligible difference in advantage between
Game N k and Game T k for a k > Q 1 using an access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n where ℓ, n ≤ q.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between
Game N k and Game T k for some k such that Q 1 < k ≤ Q using an access matrix with dimensions ≤ q, we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup. Our B is given:
such that j ̸ = j ′ , and T , where T is either equal to g dc q+1 2 or is a random element of G p 2 . B will simulate either Game N k or Game T k with A, depending on T .
B chooses random exponents α, a, κ, {h i } ∈ Z N , and sets the public parameters as
It gives these to A. We note that B knows the MSK, and hence can use the normal key generation algorithm to make normal keys in response to A's key requests from the k + 1 request and onward. To make the first k − 1 semi-functional keys, B can first make a normal key and then multiply the K by a random element of G p 2 (this can be obtained by raising g 2 to a random exponent modulo N ).
Since we are assuming the k th key query is a Phase II key query, A will request the challenge ciphertext for some ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ) before requesting the k th key. This allows B to define the exponents a ′ , κ ′ , {η i } after seeing (A, ρ) . B chooses random valuesκ, {η i } ∈ Z N . It will implicitly set a ′ = cd modulo p 2 and κ ′ = d +κ modulo p 2 . For each attribute i, we let J i denote the set of indices j such that ρ(j) = i. B define g η i 2 as:
We note that all of these terms g
are available to B, since we are assuming n, ℓ ≤ q. We note that a ′ is uniformly random because d is random, κ ′ is randomized byκ, and each η i is randomized byη i .
To form the challenge ciphertext, B chooses random exponents {γ j } ∈ Z N . It creates the normal components of the ciphertext as in the encryption algorithm. To create the semifunctional components (the parts in G p 2 ), it implicitly sets s ′ = f modulo p 2 and γ j = df b j +γ j for each j from 1 to ℓ. We note that these values are properly distributed because f,γ j are random. It also chooses random values y 2 , . . . , y n ∈ Z N and implicitly sets the sharing vector w as:
This is properly distributed as a random vector up to the constraint that the first entry is s ′ = f (note that a ′ is nonzero with all but negligible probability). For each j from 1 to ℓ, we observe that
Since j ∈ J ρ(j) , the first quantity in (1) will be canceled by (2) . What is left of (2) for all j from 1 to q ≥ ℓ and g
for each j. It can also compute
)κ , and g
. B multiplies these G p 2 components by the normal ciphertext to produce the semi-functional ciphertext, which it gives to A. Now, when A later requests the k th key for some attribute set S not satisfying (A, ρ), B responds as follows. It first creates a normal key by calling the usual key generation algorithm. To create the semi-functional components, it first chooses a vector θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ Z n N such that θ · A j = 0 modulo N for all j such that ρ(j) ∈ S and the first entry of θ is nonzero modulo each prime dividing N . Such a vector will exist as long as (1, 0, . . . , 0) is not in the span of {A j } ρ(j)∈S modulo each of p 1 , p 2 , p 3 . As in the proof of the previous lemma, we may assume this holds with all but negligible probability and we note that such a θ can be efficiently computed.
B chooses a random valueũ ∈ Z N and implicitly sets
We note that these are random modulo p 2 becauseũ and θ 1 are random (and c, f are nonzero with all but negligible probability). We observe that B can now form g u ′ 2 and g t ′ 2 as follows:
For each attribute i ∈ S, we recall that the vector θ is orthogonal to A j for all rows j such that ρ(j) = i (i.e. all j ∈ J i ). Thus, we observe:
from the terms it is given in the assumption. We also have that
Therefore, B creates the semi-functional term for key component K as:
κũ .
, then this is a properly distributed nominal semi-functional key. If T is a random element of G p 2 , this is a properly distributed temporary semi-functional key. Hence, B has properly simulated either Game N k or Game T k , depending on T , and can therefore leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage to break the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption in a subgroup.
Lemma 9. Under the general subgroup decision assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game T k and Game k for any k from 1 to Q.
Proof. This is nearly identical to the proof of Lemma 6, except that B uses Y 2 Y 3 to place a random G p 2 component on the K part of the k th key to make it a semi-functional key in the case that T has no G p 2 component.
Lemma 10. Under Assumption 1, no polynomial attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game Q and Game f inal .
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game Q and Game f inal , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break Assumption 1. B is given
where T is either e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs or a random element of G T . B will simulate either Game Q or Game f inal with A depending on the nature of T .
B chooses random exponents a, κ, {h i } ∈ Z N and sets the public parameters as:
It gives these to A. When A requests a key for an attribute set S, B creates a semi-functional key as follows. It chooses random exponents t, u, γ ∈ Z N and samples random elements R, R ′ , R ′′ , {R i } ∈ G p 3 (this can be done by raising g 3 to random exponents modulo N ). The key is formed as:
We note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional key.
To produce the semi-functional ciphertext for some ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ), B chooses random exponentsr j ∈ Z N for each j from 1 to ℓ and a random vectorṽ with first entry equal to 1. It implicitly sets v = sṽ and r j = sr j . We note that these values are properly distributed. It forms the ciphertext as:
We note that this is a semi-functional ciphertext with g s ′ 2 equal to Y 2 , κ ′ equal to the value of κ modulo p 2 , w equal to s ′ṽ modulo p 2 , g γ j 2 = Yr j 2 , and η ρ(j) equal to the value of h ρ(j) modulo p 2 for each j. We note that these values are all properly distributed because Y 2 is a random element of G p 2 , and the values of κ, h i ,r j ,ṽ modulo p 2 are distributed independently of their values modulo p 1 . Therefore, if T = e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs , this is a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of M b , and B has properly simulated Game q . If T is a random element of G T , then this is a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of a random message, and B has properly simulated Game f inal . Hence B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage to achieve a non-negligible advantage against Assumption 1.
This completes our proof of Theorem 4. We note that it is not necessary to include explicitly in the statement of the theorem that we are assuming it is hard to find a non-trivial factor of N , since this is implied by the general subgroup decision assumption.
Our System in Prime Order Groups
In this section, we will present a prime order analog of our composite order result. This is obtained by combining our composite order construction and proof with the translation techniques developed in [22] . We first present the necessary background and state our complexity assumptions in the prime order setting.
Background and Complexity Assumptions
We let G denote a group generator -an algorithm which takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a description of a bilinear group G. We define G's output as (p, G, G T , e), where p is a prime, G and G T are cyclic groups of order p, and e : G 2 → G T is a map such that: g) has order p in G T .
We will refer to G as the source group and G T as the target group. We assume that the group operations in G and G T and the map e are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ, and the group descriptions of G and G T include a generator of each group.
Our complexity assumptions in the prime order setting will be nearly identical to our assumptions in the composite order setting, except that the general subgroup decision assumption and the assumption used for the final game will be replaced by the decisional linear assumption.
The Decisional Linear Assumption Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We say that G satisfies the Decisional Linear Assumption if Adv dL G,A (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ for any PPT algorithm A.
The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We say that G satisfies The Three Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption if Adv 3DH G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ for any PPT algorithm A.
The Source Group q-Parallel BDHE Assumption Given a group generator G and a positive integer q, we define the following distribution:
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
In order to simulate an analog of the orthogonal subgroups present in composite order groups, our construction will use dual pairing vector spaces, a tool introduced by Okamoto and Takashima [27, 28, 29] . We will replace single group elements with tuples of group elements, denoted by g ⃗ v , where ⃗ v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a vector over Z p . This notation should be interpreted as:
When we write something like "raise g ⃗ v to the power c" for a scalar c ∈ Z p , we mean raising each component to the power c, i.e.:
We define a bilinear map e n on n-tuples of G by pairing componentwise and multiplying the results in G T :
where the dot product is computed modulo p. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we say two bases B :
where ψ is a nonzero element of Z p . (This is a slight abuse of the terminology "orthonormal", since ψ is not constrained to be 1.) For a generator g ∈ G, we note that
whenever i ̸ = j, where 1 here denotes the identity element in G T . We let Dual(Z n p , ψ) denote the set of pairs of dual orthonormal bases of dimension n with dot products
denote choosing a random pair of bases from this set.
Dual pairing vector spaces provide a workable analog to the prime order subgroups present in composite order groups, since they come equipped with orthogonal subspaces under the pairing e n . The notion of a subgroup can now be replaced by a subspace in the exponent, particularly a span of a subset of the basis vectors in a pair of dual orthonormal bases.
We will use a lemma noted in [22] which roughly states that if one starts by sampling a random pair of dual orthonormal bases and then applies a linear change of basis to a subset of the basis vectors (maintaining the orthonormal properties), the resulting bases are also distributed as a random pair, independent of the change of basis that was applied. More formally, we let (B, B * ) denote a pair of dual orthonormal bases over Z n p , and we let A ∈ Z m×m p be an invertible matrix for some m ≤ n. We let S m ⊆ [n] be a subset of size m. We then define new dual orthonormal bases B A , B * A as follows. We let B m denote the n × m matrix over Z p whose columns are the vectors ⃗ b i ∈ B such that i ∈ S m . Then B m A is also an n × m matrix. 
is also distributed as a random sample from Dual(Z n p , ψ). In particular, the distribution of (B A , B * A ) is independent of A. This follows simply from noting that one can recover B, B * uniquely from B A , B * A (with A fixed).
In [22] , the "Subspace Assumption" is introduced as a prime order substitute of the general subgroup decision assumption in composite order groups. It is based on the observation that if one a given g ⃗ v say, then one cannot tell if ⃗ v is in the span of ⃗ b * 1 , ⃗ b * 2 or the larger span of
when one is not given g ⃗ b 3 (though one can be given g ⃗ w for ⃗ w in the span of ⃗ b 1 , ⃗ b 2 , ⃗ b 3 , for example). The subspace assumption is implied by the decisional linear assumption and helps clarify how DLIN allows one to expand/contract spaces in the exponent in the dual pairing vector space framework, similar to the effect of the general subgroup decision assumption in the composite order setting.
The statement of the subspace assumption in [22] involves one dual orthonormal basis pair of dimension n, and is also parameterized by a positive integer k ≤ n 3 which controls how many 2-dimensional subspaces of the total n-dimensional space are expanding to 3-dimensional subspaces. It is remarked that one could additionally generalize the assumption to involve multiple bases -we will use such a generalization here, and we let the parameter m denote the number of bases. Each basis pair has its own dimension n i and its own parameter k i . For completeness, we include a proof that our statement of the subspace assumption here is implied by DLIN in Appendix A, though the proof is essentially the same as given in [22] . We note that this reduction holds for any valid choices of the parameters m, n i , k i . For the simpler statement of the subspace assumption without the clutter of multiple bases pairs, see [22] .
Our m dual orthonormal bases pairs will be denoted by (B 
) . {0, 1}) ,
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
To help the reader identity the important features of this assumption, we include heuristic illustrations of the m = 1, n = 3, k = 1 and m = 1, n = 6, k = 2 cases below, reproduced from [22] 
Construction
Our prime order construction very closely resembles our composite order construction, replacing the subgroups in the composite order setting with dual pairing vector spaces. The basis vectors which do not appear in the exponents of the construction are reserved as the semi-functional space. We note that there is no need to simulate the additional randomness provided by the G p 3 subgroup in the composite order setting. This is due to the asymmetry of the dual pairing vector spaces, since there are different bases for the ciphertexts and keys. In our security proof, knowledge of the full basis on the key side will allow the simulator to create other properly semifunctional keys while a single key is being isolated to change from normal to semi-functional. In most other respects, our security proof will be very closely analogous to the proof for our composite order system, with the subspace assumption playing the role of the general subgroup decision assumption.
Since the subspace assumption allows us to expand 2-dimensional spaces to 3-dimensional, we duplicate random exponents in our composite order construction in order to start with 2-dimensional random objects in the normal space. Our construction is influenced by taste and convenience -there are alternate choices one could make in translating our composite order scheme into the dual pairing vector space setting, but we have chosen to work with a 1-dimensional semi-functional space on some terms and a 2-dimensional semi-functional space on others. For the terms with a 2-dimensional semi-functional space, we have expanded the normal space to be 4-dimensional. This allows us to expand simultaneously into both dimensions of the semi-functional space by a single application of the subspace assumption (with n i 's equal to 6 and k i 's equal to 2).
We assume that messages to be encrypted are elements of the target group G T . We also conflate notation and consider the attribute universe to be [U] = {1, 2, . . . , U}, so U serves both as a description of the attribute universe and as a count of the total number of attributes.
Setup(λ, U) → PP, MSK The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of prime order p and a generator g. It randomly chooses two pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B, B * ), (B 0 , B * 0 ) of dimension 3 and U pairs of dual orthonormal bases (B 1 , B  *   1 ) , . . . , (B U , B * U ) of dimension 6, subject to the constraint that all of these share the same value of ψ. We let ⃗ b i , ⃗ b * i denote the basis vectors belonging to (B, B * ), and ⃗ b i,j , ⃗ b * i,j denote the basis vectors belong to (B j , B * j ) for each j from 0 to U. The setup algorithm also chooses two random exponents α 1 , α 2 ∈ Z p . The public parameters consist of:
The master secret key additionally contains:
KeyGen(MSK, S, PP) → SK The key generation algorithm chooses random exponents t 1 , t 2 , u 1 , u 2 ∈ Z p and computes:
The secret key is
For an ℓ × n access matrix A, the encryption algorithm chooses random exponents s 1 , s 2 , {r 1 j , r 2 j } ℓ j=1 ∈ Z p . It also chooses random vectors v 1 , v 2 ∈ Z n p with first entries equal to s 1 and s 2 respectively. The ciphertext is formed as (it additionally includes (A, ρ)):
Decrypt(CT, PP, SK) → M For a secret key corresponding to a satisfying set S, the decryption algorithm computes constants ω j ∈ Z p such that
It then computes:
The message is recovered as:
Correctness We observe that for each j,
Thus,
We note that
and therefore:
Security Proof
We now prove:
Theorem 13. Under the decisional linear assumption, the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption defined in Section 5.1, our CP-ABE scheme defined in Section 5.2 is fully secure (in the sense of Definition 3).
Our security proof here is quite similar to the proof for our composite order scheme. We begin by defining our various types of semi-functional keys and ciphertexts. The semi-functional space in the exponent will correspond to the span of ⃗ b 3 
Semi-functional Keys
To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of K, K 0 , {K i } i∈S . One then chooses a random value γ ∈ Z p and multiplies K by g γ ⃗ b * 3 . The other components of the key remain unchanged.
Semi-functional Ciphertexts
To produce a semi-functional ciphertext for an LSSS matrix (A, ρ), one first calls the normal encryption algorithm to produce a normal ciphertext consisting of M ′ , C, C 0 , {C j }. One then chooses random values s 3 , {r 3 j } ∈ Z p and a random vector v 3 ∈ Z n p with first entry equal to s 3 . The semi-functional ciphertext is:
Nominal Semi-functional Keys To produce a nominal semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of K, K 0 , {K i } i∈S . One then chooses random values t 3 , u 3 ∈ Z p . The nominal semi-functional key is: Kg
Temporary Semi-functional Keys A temporary semi-functional key is similar to a nominal key, except that the semi-functional component attached to K will now be randomized (this will prevent correct decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext). More formally, to produce a temporary semi-functional key for an attribute set S, one first calls the normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key consisting of K, K 0 , {K i } i∈S . One then chooses random values t 3 , u 3 , γ ∈ Z p . The temporary semi-functional key is formed as:
We define Game real , Game k , Game N k , Game T k , and Game f inal as before. The hybrid security proof is accomplished in the following lemmas.
Lemma 14.
Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a nonnegligible difference in advantage between Game real and Game 0 .
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game real and Game 0 , we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with parameters m = U + 2, n i = 3, k i = 1 for two values of i, and n i = 6, k i = 2 for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (D,
. B is given (we will ignore the U terms and µ 3 because they will not be needed):
The exponents of the unknown terms T 1 , T 1,0 are distributed either as
respectively. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms T 1,i , T 2,i are distributed either as τ 1 
respectively. It is B's task to determine if these τ 3 contributions are present or not. B implicitly sets the bases for the construction as:
We note that these are properly distributed because (D, D * ), (D 0 , D * 0 ), etc. are randomly chosen (up to sharing the same ψ value).
B can use the terms given in the assumption to produce g
for the public parameters. B chooses random valuesα 1 ,α 2 ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets α 1 = ηα 1 and α 2 = βα 2 . This allows it to produce e(g, g)
B gives the public parameters to A. To produce a normal key for an attribute set S, B proceeds as follows. It chooses random valuest 1 ,t 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets t 1 = ηt 1 , t 2 = βt 2 , u 1 = ηũ 1 , u 2 = βũ 2 . It forms the key as:
To produce the challenge ciphertext for an access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n, B implicitly sets s 1 = τ 1 and s 2 = τ 2 . It chooses a random vector v ∈ Z n p with first entry equal to 1. It also chooses random vectorsṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ∈ Z n p with first entries equal to 0. It will implicitly set v 1 = s 1 v +ṽ 1 and v 2 = s 2 v +ṽ 2 . We note that these are properly distributed as independent, random vectors with first entries equal to s 1 and s 2 respectively. For each j from 1 to ℓ, B also chooses random valuesr 1 j ,r 2 j ,r 3 j ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets r 1 j =r 3 j τ 1 +r 1 j , r 2 j =r 3 j τ 2 +r 2 j . We note that these values are properly distributed becauser 1 j ,r 2 j are random. The ciphertext is formed as:
If the exponents of the T terms do not include the τ 3 terms, then the exponent vector of C is
, and the exponent vector of C j is:
Thus we have a properly distributed normal ciphertext in this case.
If the exponents of the T terms do include the τ 3 terms, then the exponent vector of C is 3, 0 , and the exponent vector of each C j is:
This is a properly distributed semi-functional ciphertext with v 3 = τ 3 v and r 3 j = τ 3r Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game k−1 and Game N k for some k, we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the subspace assumption. We will employ the subspace assumption with parameters m = U +2, n i = 3, k i = 1 for two values of i, and n i = 6, k i = 2 for the rest of the values of i. In order to reconcile the notation of the assumption with the notation of our construction as conveniently as possible, we will denote the bases involved in the assumption by (B, B * ),
. B is given (we will ignore µ 3 because it will not be needed):
respectively. Similarly, the exponents of the unknown terms T 1,i , T 2,i are distributed either as 
B can thus produce the public parameters, and it gives these to A.
To respond to A's first k − 1 key queries, B acts as follows. To produce a semi-functional key for an attribute set S, it chooses random valuest 1 ,t 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , γ ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets t 1 = ηt 1 , t 2 = βt 2 , u 1 = ηũ 1 , u 2 = βũ 2 . It forms the key as:
In this way, B produces properly distributed semi-functional keys in response to the first k − 1 key requests. We note that B can similarly produce normal keys in response to key requests k + 1 and onward using the same procedure except leaving off g γ ⃗ b * 3 from K. To create the k th key for some attribute set S, B proceeds as follows. It chooses random valuesũ 1 ,ũ 2 ,ũ 3 ∈ Z p . It implicitly sets t 1 = ητ 1 , t 2 = βτ 2 , u 1 = η(τ 1ũ3 +ũ 1 ), and u 2 = β(τ 2ũ3 +ũ 2 ). We note that these values are independently random because τ 1 , τ 2 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 are independently random. The key is formed as:
If the exponents of the T terms here do not include the τ 3 terms, then this is a properly distributed normal key. If they do include the τ 3 terms, then this is a properly distributed nominal semi-functional key with t 3 = τ 3 and u 3 = τ 3ũ3 . (Note that these values are random and independent of t 1 , t 2 , u 1 , u 2 .) To create the semi-functional ciphertext for some n × ℓ access matrix (A, ρ) , B chooses random valuesr 1 j ,r 2 j ,r 3 j ∈ Z p for each j from 1 to ℓ. It also chooses a random vector v ∈ Z n p with first entry equal to 1, and random vectorsṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ∈ Z n p with first entries equal to 0. It implicitly sets s 1 
j +r 2 j , and r 3 j = µ 3r 3 j . We note that these values are properly distributed. The ciphertext is formed as:
Thus, when the τ 3 terms are absent, B properly simulates Game k−1 , and when the τ 3 terms are present, B properly simulates Game N k . As a result, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible advantage against the subspace assumption. 
The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point we may verify that all of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . ., (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed). B chooses α 1 , α 2 ∈ Z p randomly. We observe that B can now produce the public parameters, and also knows the master secret key (enabling it to create normal keys). It gives the public parameters to A. 
are properly distributed, and their distribution is independent of x, y, and S (the involvement of x, y, and S is only present in B's view and is information-theoretically hidden from A, see Lemma 11) .
To create the k th key, B first creates a normal key with components K, K 0 , {K i } i∈S . To create the semi-functional components, it chooses a random valueũ 3 and implicitly sets t 3 = z, u 3 = (xy) −1ũ 3 . It then forms the semi-functional component for K 0 as
and the semi-functional component for each
It forms the semi-functional component for K as:
, as required for a nominal semi-functional key. Otherwise, this exponent vector is distributed as a random multiple of ⃗ b * 3 , as required for a temporary semi-functional key. B multiplies these semi-functional components with the normal K, K 0 , {K i } i∈S to produce the key it gives to A.
At some later point, A requests the challenge ciphertext for some ℓ × n access matrix (A, ρ) that is not satisfied by the attribute set S. B first creates a normal ciphertext with components
. To create the semi-functional components, B first computes a vector ν ∈ Z n p that has first entry equal to 1 and is orthogonal to all of the rows A j of A such that ρ(j) ∈ S (such a vector must exist since S fails to satisfy A, and it is efficiently computable). B also chooses a random vectorṽ 3 ∈ Z n p subject to the constraint that the first entry is zero. It implicitly sets s 3 = xy and sets v 3 = xyν + xṽ 3 . We note that s 3 is random because all of the dual orthonormal bases are distributed independently of x, y, and v 3 is distributed as a random vector with first entry equal to s 3 . B also chooses random values r 3 j ∈ Z p for all j such that ρ(j) ∈ S and random valuesr 3 j ∈ Z p for all j such that ρ(j) / ∈ S. For values of j such that ρ(j) / ∈ S, it implicitly sets r 3 j = xr 3 j . B can then produce the semi-functional components of the ciphertext as: Here we have used the fact that A j · ν ≡ 0 modulo p to avoid needing to produce a multiple of B multiplies these semi-functional components by the normal components to form the semifunctional ciphertext, which is gives to A. It can respond to the rest of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm. If T = g xyz , then B has properly simulated Game N K , and if T is a random group element, then B has properly simulated Game T k . Thus, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to gain a non-negligible advantage against the three party Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Lemma 17.
Under the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game N k and Game T k for a k > Q 1 using an access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n where ℓ, n ≤ q.
Proof. Given a PPT attacker A achieving a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game N k and Game T k for some k such that Q 1 < k ≤ Q using an access matrix with dimensions ≤ q, we will create a PPT algorithm B to break the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption. . . , U. The semi-functional portions of these bases will be set later (at which point we may verify that all of (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . ., (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed). B chooses α 1 , α 2 ∈ Z p randomly. We observe that B can now produce the public parameters, and also knows the master secret key (enabling it to create normal keys). It gives the public parameters to A. To create the first k − 1 semi-functional keys in response to A's key requests, B first creates a normal key, then raises g ⃗ d * 3 to a random exponent in Z p and multiplies this by K. As in the proof of the previous lemma, we note here that B does not need to know g ⃗ b * 3 precisely in order to create well-distributed semi-functional keys.
Before requesting the k th key, A will request the challenge ciphertext for some access matrix (A, ρ) of size ℓ × n, where both ℓ, n ≤ q. We observe that (B 1 , B * 1 ), . . ., (B U , B * U ) are properly distributed.
To create the challenge ciphertext, B first creates a normal ciphertext using the normal encryption algorithm. To create the semi-functional components, it implicitly sets s 3 = cdf . It also chooses random values y 2 , . . . , y n ∈ Z p and random valuesr 3 j ∈ Z p for each j ∈ [ℓ]. It implicitly sets v 3 = (cdf, df c 2 + y 2 , . . . , df c n + y n ). This is distributed as a random vector with first entry equal to s 3 . For each j ∈ [ℓ], B implicitly sets r j 3 = −df b j η ρ(j) +r j 3 η ρ(j) . These are distributed as uniformly random elements because eachr 3 j is random and η ρ(j) ̸ = 0 (with all but negligible probability). We observe:
A j · v 3 + r By definition, j ∈ J ρ(j) , so we have some cancelation here:
A j ·v 3 +r We now see that B can compute g A j ·v 3 +r 3 j using the terms it is given in the assumption, enabling it to produce g For each j ∈ J i , we have ρ(j) = i. So for i ∈ S, we have A j · w = 0 modulo p for every j ∈ J i . Thus, all of the terms involving c q+1 cancel, and we are left with terms that can be created in the exponent from the group elements given in the assumption (note that n ≤ q, so 2q is an upper bound on the powers of c involved here). This shows that B can create g t 3 ⃗ b 6,i for all i ∈ S, and hence can produce properly distributed semi-functional components for each K i of the k th key. B can respond to the rest of A's key requests by producing normal keys via the normal key generation algorithm. If T = g dc q+1 , then B has properly simulated Game N k . If T is distributed randomly, then B has properly simulated Game T k . Thus, B can leverage A's non-negligible difference in advantage between these games to achieve a non-negligible advantage against the source group q-parallel BDHE assumption.
Lemma 18.
Under the subspace assumption, no polynomial time attacker can achieve a nonnegligible difference in advantage between Game T k and Game k for any k from 1 to Q.
Conclusion
We have presented CP-ABE schemes in composite order and prime order bilinear groups that are fully secure and allow arbitrary reuse of attributes in access policies. Along the way, we have developed a methodology for combining proof techniques in the selective setting with dual system encryption in order to obtain full security proofs. As a consequence of the limitations of current selective techniques for CP-ABE systems, we inherit a reliance on a q-based complexity assumption. Obtaining a proof of full security in the standard model from static assumptions without imposing any efficiency-losing restrictions remains an important open problem.
